Employment Research Newsletter
Volume 27

Number 2

Article 5

4-27-2020

Employment Research, Vol. 27, No. 2, April 2020

Follow this and additional works at: https://research.upjohn.org/empl_research

Citation
W.E. Upjohn Institute. 2020. Employment Research. 27(2). https://doi.org/10.17848/1075-8445.27(2)

This title is brought to you by the Upjohn Institute. For more information, please contact repository@upjohn.org.

APRIL 2020 • VOL 27, NO 2

Special Issue on the Coronavirus Pandemic’s Economic Efects
This special digital-only issue features four proposals from Upjohn research staf that focus on
some of the sobering impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the U.S. economy. Some parts of these
proposals were incorporated into the already-enacted CARES Act. Others merit inclusion in ensuing
emergency legislation. Also included are summaries of and links to additional proposals aimed at
alleviating a variety of related difculties facing workers and their families at this time.
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Te current coronavirus pandemic is likely
not only to cause many deaths and acute health
problems, but also to seriously limit the ability of
many people to work and make ends meet. What
can be done to help alleviate this damage?
We are economists, not public health experts,
so we focus on what we can do to mobilize the
economy to deal with this crisis, and leave the
needed public health measures to others. But let’s
outline a few economic responses that are needed.
1) Mobilize the economy to produce more
health system capacity. On an emergency basis, the
capacity of our health systems must be expanded
to treat more patients. We need to ask public
health experts what is needed, and use emergency,
wartime-equivalent powers to get factories to
produce what is needed. Many public health
experts, for example, suggest we will need more
ventilators to help treat severe cases of coronavirus.
What factories could be quickly repurposed to
produce more ventilators? Te federal government
needs to order this to be done, and pay for it, just
as the government mobilized Detroit to produce
planes during World War II. Do we need more
hospital capacity? Te Army helped set up Civilian
Conservation Corps camps quite quickly during
the Great Depression; we will likely need some tent
hospitals, drive-through testing, and possibly even
quick conversions of vacant buildings. Military
and VA health care workers may be needed to staf
these additional facilities.

2) Compensate the unemployed without
conditions. We need to pay unemployment benefts
to all the unemployed, even those who aren’t
normally eligible for unemployment insurance.
Our colleagues Chris O’Leary and Steve Wandner

We need to use emergency, wartimeequivalent powers to get factories to
produce what is needed.
have put together a proposal on how this could
be done, including how to reach independent
contractors, self-employed workers, and others
not covered by unemployment insurance. We
should also inform and encourage employers to
adopt short-time compensation, as suggested by
our colleagues Katharine Abraham and Susan
Houseman, allowing businesses to reduce workers’
hours without laying them of, while workers could
still collect partial unemployment benefts. We
have a fexible unemployment benefts system; let’s
use it to full efect.
3) Bail out businesses for losses from the
pandemic, but impose more stringent conditions
on larger businesses. Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel
Zucman have proposed government grants to
pay for the maintenance costs of businesses—
from payroll to rent to interest on debt—that are
efectively shut down from the pandemic. We
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prefer open lines of credit—at the
government’s long-term borrowing
rate, roughly 1 percent—to businesses
with fewer than 500 employees. Tese
smaller businesses, encompassing
about 60 percent of workers, are the
ones most likely to sufer cash fow
problems and be at greater risk of
liquidation without support. Any loans
from these lines of credit should have
repayments deferred for 2 years, and
another 20 years over which to repay

The fow of aid to state and local
governments should increase
if the recession gets worse,
and it should be targeted toward
the most afected areas.
the loans. For larger businesses, lines of
credit could also be an option, but any
additional measures, such as the fatout bailouts sought by airlines, should
come with conditions on maintaining
payroll and rehiring, and possibly
a government equity stake, as was
done with the auto industry bailout
during the Great Recession. For large
businesses, we need to send a signal
that government’s implicit guarantees
come with some cost.
4) Basic income payments to all
immediately, as a way of alleviating
economic distress and setting the
stage for a recovery. Jason Furman
and Claudia Sahm have proposed
immediate cash payments of at least
$1,000 or more per household. Tis
would help alleviate economic distress:
people could pay their rent or buy
food. Yes, sending a check to everyone
makes for poor targeting, giving money
to many who don’t (yet) need it. But it’s
simple and fast. To better target funds
to those most likely to need them, the
U.S. Treasury could send checks to
tax flers with adjusted gross incomes
below some amount, say $50,000,
as well as those who did not fle a
tax return. Such monies would help
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people avoid eviction, repossession of
a car, or forgoing food and medicine.
Depending on how bad economic
conditions get, these payments could
be repeated, based on automatic
unemployment rate triggers.
5) Incentivize job preservation and
job creation. Beginning immediately,
and at least through 2021, provide a
15 percent payroll tax credit on FTE
employees above 90 percent of the
business’s precrisis FTE employment
level. Tis credit would go to any
employer with employees: forproft, nonproft, and state and local
governments. Te goal: encourage
employers to “go frst” in hiring, and
take a risk. Will some of this money
go to hospitals likely to expand during
the crisis anyway? Yes—and they’ll
need it to pay for additional equipment
and overtime for staf. For most other
businesses, the incentives may help
retain—and rehire—workers. We
want to make the recovery from this
recession rapid rather than gradual,
and part of that involves encouraging
employment expansion.
6) Federal aid to hard-hit state and
local governments through revenue
sharing. During a recession, state
and local tax revenue decline while
the need for state and local public
spending rises. Tese fscal pressures
will be particularly acute in areas with
heavy concentration in industries
already afected by the current crisis.
Such areas include those that depend
greatly on tourism, travel, or energy.
Tese areas, despite being at risk
of sufering the greatest economic
consequences, will be the least able to
adequately respond. Because state and
local governments must balance their
budgets, fscal pressures will likely
lead to cutbacks in spending, making
any recession worse. Te federal
government should help by providing
revenue to state and local governments.
During the Great Recession, for
example, such assistance peaked at over
$100 billion. A variety of options exist

for providing aid, including adjusting
Medicaid reimbursement rates or
increasing block grants. Te fow of aid
should be structured to increase if the
recession gets worse, and it should be
targeted toward the most afected areas.
Is this all that is needed? Probably
not! We will need to adjust policies as
public health and economic conditions
change. Now is the time for the
government to be bold and quick on its
feet. We must all be open to new ideas
as events unfold.

Timothy J. Bartik is a senior economist at the
Upjohn Institute.
Brad J. Hershbein is a senior economist and director
of information and communications services at the
Upjohn Institute.
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An Unemployment
Insurance COVID-19
Crisis Response
Stephen A. Wandner and Christopher J. O’Leary
Te COVID-19 virus is likely to
cause major disruptions in U.S. labor
markets for at least 18 months—until
a vaccine is developed and widely
administered. Any program to help
afected workers and stimulate the U.S.
economy should be carefully targeted
to workers who are most in need of
income support and most likely to
quickly spend these funds in the local
economy.
Four groups of workers will most
likely sufer severe problems during the
COVID-19 crisis:
• Sick individuals whose jobs do
not provide sick leave or sufcient
sick leave.
• Unemployed workers who are
covered by unemployment
insurance (UI) but are deemed
ineligible because they do not
satisfy the requirements for being
able to, being available for, and
actively seeking work, among
other eligibility requirements.
• Unemployed workers who receive
UI benefts but have exhausted
their regular UI benefts.
• Workers not covered by the UI
program, including the selfemployed, contract employees,
and, more generally, “gig workers.”
Tese groups may all sufer earnings
losses because of illness, public health
requirements for social distancing
from coworkers or customers during
the crisis, and declines in economic
demand for the products and services
they provide. Tey may lose labor
income, be ineligible for UI, or
exhaust their benefts. Unless they
have substantial savings, they will be

unable to pay for basic needs—food,
rent, medical care, car payments—for
themselves and their families. Teir
decreased spending will also harm
their local economies.
Proposal
We propose changes to UI
programs to provide income to covered
unemployed workers, to workers still
technically employed but without sick
leave, and to those unemployed but
not covered by UI. Specifcally, two
packages of UI initiatives should be
undertaken, with each limited to an
18-month time frame.
COVID-19 Unemployment Insurance
Program Refnements
• Access to benefts: States should
simplify the UI application
process and provide telephone
support to UI applicants who
have difculty applying for
benefts.
• Able and available: Workers
sufering from COVID-19 or in
a required recovery quarantine
should have the “able and
available” work requirements to
receive UI waived.
• Actively seeking work:
Unemployed workers from jobs
that do not permit sufcient
social distancing from coworkers
and customers should have UI’s
work search requirements lifed.
Workers allowed to telecommute
must continue to work.
• Beneft standards: All states
should be required to ofer

benefts for a potential duration
of at least 26 weeks, and the
maximum weekly beneft amount
should be two-thirds of the
average weekly wage among UIcovered workers in that state.
• Administration: Te federal
government should substantially
increase grants to states to
pay for the administration
of state UI programs, as well
as a new COVID-19 Special
Unemployment Assistance
program (see below).
• Temporary emergency
compensation: A temporary
emergency compensation
program extending the duration
of benefts for 26 weeks should
be made available to all UI
recipients, in all states, regardless
of the unemployment rate. It
should be enacted by Congress
and paid for from federal general
revenue.
• Permanent extended benefts:
Extended benefts should be
federalized and paid from
federal general revenue. Tis
would provide up to 13 weeks of
additional UI benefts when the
state total unemployment rate is
above 5 percent in the preceding
month.
COVID-19 Special
Unemployment Assistance
During the severe 1974–1975
recession, Congress enacted a Special
Unemployment Assistance (SUA)
program that paid benefts to workers
not covered by the regular UI program.
Te program was temporary and
paid with federal general revenue.
A similar temporary program could
be created to pay unemployment
assistance to workers who become sick
from COVID-19 or have been laid of
because they were employed in jobs
that prevent social distancing and
either 1) don’t have or have exhausted
their sick leave or 2) who become
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unemployed and work in uncovered
employment. SUA benefts would
• be payable to self-employed,
contract, and gig economy
workers;
• be payable for up to 52 weeks;
• be paid using state beneft
formulas but with crisis
enhancements to amounts and
durations listed above;
• determine monetary eligibility
by payroll or tax fling records;
• waive “able, available, and
actively seeking work”
requirements as described
above;
• ensure beneft access by having
state UI staf assist with the SUA
application, whether this be a
new process or adapted from
the Disaster Unemployment
Assistance program.
Te temporary UI program
refnements and COVID-19 SUA
program would together provide
income support to the great majority
of workers adversely afected by the
COVID-19 economic shock. State
UI programs across the country
are uniquely suited to enroll new
participants in income transfer
payment programs, process weekly
or biweekly cash payments, and
rapidly establish programs in times
of emergencies. State UI agencies
have experience with Disaster
Unemployment Assistance, the 9/11
airline unemployment assistance
program, and temporary emergency
compensation programs during
recessions.

Christopher J. O’Leary is a senior economist at the
Upjohn Institute.
Stephen A. Wandner is a research fellow at the
Upjohn Institute.
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Disaster Unemployment
Assistance Would Help Gig,
Contract, Self-Employed
Workers Afected by COVID-19
Stephen A. Woodbury
Many, perhaps most, workers who
have lost their jobs as a result of the
COVID-19 pandemic will be eligible
to receive regular state unemployment
insurance (UI) benefts for up to 26
weeks. But many other job losers who
have a strong attachment to the labor
force and depend on their earnings—
self-employed workers, contract
workers, gig workers, and others—are
ineligible for UI because they have not
been on the payroll of an employer who
has paid UI taxes on their earnings.
Disaster Unemployment Assistance
(DUA) would make these selfemployed workers, contract workers,
and gig workers eligible to receive UI
benefts. It is almost certainly the most
efective fscal policy tool available to
the federal government to quickly blunt
the economic damage resulting from
the COVID-19 pandemic.
DUA is normally paid to workers
who lose their jobs, but do not qualify
for regular UI benefts, following
natural disasters such as hurricanes,
foods, tornadoes, and geological
disasters like earthquakes and volcanic
eruptions. Te program is initiated by
a presidential disaster declaration and
administered by the state UI agencies,
which in turn are overseen by the U.S.
Department of Labor.
DUA requires no new congressional
legislation—it is authorized by
the Staford Act of 1988—and the
administrative structure needed to
make it run already exists. Because
DUA is funded by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency, it
side-steps the eligibility problem faced
by self-employed workers under the
regular state UI program.

Te advantage of DUA over other
modifcations to UI being considered,
such as extended benefts, is that it
assists workers who would otherwise
not receive benefts, and it does so
quickly—typically within two to three
weeks of job loss. As a result, it is
targeted to individuals whose work
and incomes have been interrupted
and who will likely require income for
basics such as rent and utilities, car
payments, and groceries.
In short, DUA would target federal
fnancial assistance to a large group
of workers whose work and pay have
ended as a result of the COVID-19
pandemic, but who are ineligible for
UI benefts because of their selfemployment status. Te legislative
authority exists, and the apparatus to
run the program is ready to go. Only
a presidential disaster declaration
is needed to start what could now
be the most benefcial single fscal
policy action available to the federal
government.
References
Vera Brusentsev and Wayne Vroman, Disasters
in the United States: Frequency, Costs, and
Compensation (Kalamazoo, Michigan: W.E.
Upjohn Institute, 2017).
U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
Federal Emergency Management Agency,
“Disaster Unemployment Assistance Fact
Sheet,” May 2018.
U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and
Training Administration, Unemployment
Insurance Disaster Unemployment Assistance
Handbook (ET Handbook No. 356 [DUA]),
July 2006.

Stephen A. Woodbury is a senior economist at the
Upjohn Institute.
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What Is the Likely Impact
of Proposed COVID-19
Stimulus Payments?
Marta Lachowska
and how households are able to spend
their payments. With people practicing
social distancing and shops and
restaurants closed, consumers might
be constrained in their ability to spend,
particularly on services, resulting in a
diferent composition of spending, and
possibly a lower level, than in either
2001 or 2008.
But even if the proposed rebates
were not spent, as were the 2001 and
2008 rebates, research suggests they
might buy people some peace of
mind. My research (here, here, and
here) showed that the 2008 stimulus
payments had a large efect on reducing
feelings of worry and stress. Te fgure
below illustrates the magnitude of these

Marta Lachowska is a senior economist at the
Upjohn Institute.

Figure 1 The Efect of Receiving Payment on Various Emotions
10
Change in the share reporting a given emotion (%)

On March 17, 2020, the Trump
administration announced plans to
send a payment of at least $1,000 to
each household in the United States,
with the goal of alleviating the negative
economic efects of the COVID-19
pandemic.
What does research have to say
about the likely impact of such
payments? Previous administrations
have used similar economic stimulus
payments—also referred to as
tax rebates—to counteract falling
consumer demand. Tese tax rebates
have been extensively evaluated by
researchers.
In 2008, the Bush administration
implemented one-time tax rebates
averaging about $1,000 per household
to about 130 million low- and middleincome families. A similar but less
generous program was implemented
in 2001. In both cases, the rebates were
disbursed using a close-to-random
schedule, so it is possible to isolate
their causal efects on outcomes.
What were these efects? Studies
have shown that both the 2001 and
2008 rebates had a positive impact
on household spending. In 2001,
households spent two-thirds of their
rebates in the quarter of payment and
the quarter following payment, and
in 2008, households spent up to 90
percent of their rebates in the quarter
of payment and the following quarter.
Moreover, the 2008 rebates increased
personal consumption expenditures
by up to 2.3 percent in the quarter of
payment, and by up to 1 percent in
the following quarter. Tese are large
efects.
Are similar efects to be expected
now? Tat depends in part on whether

efects. And as consumer confdence
plunges, measures to boost consumers’
emotional well-being may beneft
economic activity in the longer run.
Finally, it is important to ask
whether a rebate that is dispersed to all
households is the most efective way
to spend on the order of $100 billion.
Small service-oriented businesses face
severe hardship due to the COVID-19
outbreak, so a stimulus targeted to
provide liquidity to these businesses
might be more efective. And for
households facing job loss due to
the pandemic, a one-time payment
would be less efective than a program
providing ongoing liquidity. One
possibility is to activate the Disaster
Unemployment Assistance program,
which would expand the availability
of unemployment insurance to selfemployed and other workers who
otherwise would be ineligible for
benefts.
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SOURCE: Lachowska (2017).
NOTE: The estimates come from the last two columns of Table 5 in Lachowska (2015). * denotes that the change in
the share reporting a given emotion is statistically signifcant at a 5 percent level.
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Additional Proposals
Shared-Work Programs Can Ease
the Coronavirus’s Economic Impact
Katharine Abraham and Susan N. Houseman

such as cash payments, reforming
unemployment insurance, and work
sharing. Read more.

Te COVID-19 outbreak is
causing massive disruption to the U.S.
economy, with one-ffh of workers
already reporting losing hours or
work because of the pandemic. In
such situations, layofs are ofen seen
as inevitable. But, unless a business
has been forced to close, there’s a way
to keep workers on the payroll and
ease the pain of a downturn. It’s called
“work-sharing,” and 26 states covering
about 70 percent of the U.S. workforce
ofer a work-sharing option in their
unemployment insurance system.
Te authors detail what states and the
federal government should do now
to ensure that employers can and will
implement work-sharing in a Politico
opinion piece, “Te Smart Way to Save
Jobs in the Time of Coronavirus.”

Stimulus Steps the U.S. Should
Take to Reduce Regional Economic
Damages from the COVID-19
Recession
Timothy J. Bartik, Brad Hershbein, Mark Muro,
and Bryan A. Stuart

Preserving Jobs Despite the
Coronavirus: Encouraging
“Labor Hoarding”
Timothy J. Bartik
Te coronavirus will inevitably have
negative efects on economic output
and jobs in the short run. But due to
reduced consumer confdence and
business confdence, this pandemic
could also lead to a long and severe
recession. Te loss of jobs for some
individuals could seriously damage
their long-run economic prospects.
Bartik proposes providing
government assistance to encourage
“labor hoarding” by employers—
maintaining payrolls even with
decreased demand—to reduce the
long-run damage from what may be
a serious recession. Tis, a revised
version of a 2009 proposal with John
Bishop for a Job Creation Tax Credit,
is meant to be a complement for other
proposals to boost the economy,
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In addition to responding to the
public health needs, policymakers are
debating how they can respond with
creative new economic policies, which
are now urgently needed. One strategy
they should consider is to leverage a
sizable surge of federal aid to state and
local governments (now conspicuously
absent from federal stimulus packages)
to help counter the pandemic’s coming
negative impacts on the hardest-hit
regional economies. To help these
places, the authors suggest three federal
actions. Read more.
Housing Policy Is Crucial to Stem
the Coronavirus Fallout
Lee Adams, Brian Asquith, and Evan Mast
Many laid-of workers are in
danger of becoming delinquent on
rents or mortgages, putting them
at risk for foreclosure and eviction.
Helping people maintain housing
stability is even more important than
normal, as public health ofcials
urge the public to stay at home in
order to quash transmission of the
coronavirus. Te authors highlight
fve areas where policymakers should
quickly act in order to address both
current and future problems in the
housing market. Te proposed policies
are relatively simple to implement
but could have wide and immediate
economic and public health benefts.
Read more.

Food Stamps and
Unemployment Compensation
in the COVID-19 Crisis
Christopher J. O’Leary
Te Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and
Economic Security Act (CARES
Act) signifcantly increased access
and benefts for Unemployment
Insurance (UI) and the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP),
previously known as food stamps.
Tese two programs responded quickly
during the Great Recession to become
the most important strands in the
social safety net. Many adults received
benefts from one or both programs
during the crisis. However, features of
the massive federal fscal stimulus in
the CARES Act suggest the patterns of
SNAP and UI program use might difer
from the Great Recession. Read more.
Fiscal Freefall for State and Local
Governments: The Crisis We Are
Not (Yet) Addressing
Timothy Bartik, Michelle Miller-Adams, and
John Austin
Te authors call on Congress to
provide substantial state and local
aid—at least $250 billion for states
alone—in order to mitigate the longterm consequences of the current
COVID-19-induced economic crisis.
Furthermore, they describe the
importance of that aid being targeted at
the hardest-hit regions. Read more.
Congress CARES But Private
Student Loan Debt Remains
Blind Spot in the COVID-19
Relief Package
Daniel A. Collier, Chris Marsicano, and
Dan Fitzpatrick
Te CARES Act provides federal
student loan debt relief but has a
blind spot for borrowers with private
student loans. Low-income, racial
minority, and frst-generation students
disproportionately borrow from private
lenders. Te complete lack of private
student loan debt relief in the CARES
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Act works against its great intentions—
to support Americans in need as
COVID-19 pushes the country into
economic crisis. Te authors believe
that Congress should take up private
student loan relief, treating privately
funded student loan debt the same as
federally funded student loan debt.
Read more.
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New! 2020–2021
Publications Catalog
With our new catalog, the
Upjohn Press now ofers over 200
books—from its backlist along
with selected frontlist titles and
its WEfocus books—as free PDF
downloads. Tis provides anyone
unlimited access to decades’ worth
of leading scholarship on a wide
range of labor-related issues. Scroll
through this online version and
fnd links to all our books dating
back to 1980. Or, you can visit the
Institute’s digital repository for a
list of all available titles at https://
research.upjohn.org/openaccess/.

As this crisis unfolds, Upjohn staf
will continue posting new policy
proposals to address COVID-19related issues and responding to
the latest data provided by the
Department of Labor. Keep up by
visiting our website or by following
us on Twitter (see links in the blue
box below).

Link to catalog - https://research.
upjohn.org/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1281&context=up_
press
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